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Iran Threatens Investors in US Military Bonds
Financeirozhlas16d ago

Iran Threatens Investors in US Military Bonds

Iran's parliament speaker, Mohammad Báker Kálíbáf, warned international investors and financial institutions that entities funding the US military apparatus through American bonds are now considered legitimate targets.

Trump's Focus on Iran's Kharg Island Escalates US-Iran Conflict
PoliticsAPReutersFT+16The GuardianAl Jazeeracnbcfazlsm-lvel-mundodennik-nindex-hr+8 more23d ago19 sources

Trump's Focus on Iran's Kharg Island Escalates US-Iran Conflict

Trump's decision to order strikes on Iran's Kharg Island has made the critical oil hub central to the escalating US-Iran conflict, with the US president suggesting further strikes 'just for fun'.

Greek court convicts Predator spyware defendants, including Cyprus-linked businessman Tal Dilian
Politicsiefimeridain-cyprusekathimerini1mo ago3 sources

Greek court convicts Predator spyware defendants, including Cyprus-linked businessman Tal Dilian

A Greek court has convicted four people over the illegal use of Predator spyware, in a case with direct links to the Cyprus surveillance scandal first exposed by Phileleftheros in 2022 and 2023. The defendants — Tal Dilian, the Cyprus-linked founder of the Intellexa Group; Sara Hamou, reportedly his second wife; Greek businessman Felix Bitzios; […]

Politicspublico1mo ago

The anti-radical Luís Neves

The new MAI (Minister of Internal Administration) did not come from a discreet office nor from a party apparatus, and suggests security and authority. All of this matters in these times. Editorial by Pedro Candeias

Terrorism spiral
WorldDawn1mo ago

Terrorism spiral

WITH a spate of terrorist attacks occurring in the country, a national-level response is required to address the issue. The latest atrocity has occurred in Bajaur, where a suicide bomber reportedly belonging to the banned TTP attacked a checkpost in Bajaur on Monday. At least 12 people were martyred in the incident — 11 security personnel and one minor girl. Meanwhile, on the same day, a motorcycle rigged with explosives was blown up outside a police station in Bannu, causing two fatalities. Furthermore, law enforcers said on Wednesday that terrorists attacked a police station and a customs office in Dera Ismail Khan, martyring a policeman and a customs officer. They added that the terrorists also fired at passenger buses in the area. Several acts of deadly violence have occurred in this area over the past few weeks. Following the Bajaur attack, the prime minister commented that “under the vision of Azm-i-Istehkam, security forces are gaining major success in the fight against terrorism”. While that may be so, Pakistan continues to pay a high price as it loses security personnel and civilians in frequent terrorist attacks. For example, apart from the latest violence in KP, an imambargah in Islamabad was attacked earlier this month causing major casualties, while only days before the atrocity in the capital terrorists had launched coordinated attacks in Balochistan. Unless the state takes a fresh approach towards terrorism, we may see the same high levels of violence in the current year as we did in 2025. Last year was said to be the bloodiest in over a decade. The threats may be varied — separatist terrorists in Balochistan, religiously inspired elements in KP — but the response must ensure that all violent elements are neutralised, and the state is able to establish peace in the disturbed areas. There has been some welcome recent cooperation between the KP government — which remains the hardest hit province — and the centre in the field of counterterrorism; such efforts must be intensified. A whole-of-nation approach is needed, applying kinetic measures where required, conducting intel-based operations as well as sociopolitical interventions as needed, to defeat terrorism. The federal and provincial governments, lawmakers and the security apparatus, along with CT experts, must put their heads together to arrive at a solution that can bring lasting peace to Pakistan. Published in Dawn, February 19th, 2026

The burdens of war
WorldDawn1mo ago

The burdens of war

FOR many decades now, Pakistan has been investing in a large and expensive military apparatus to fend off external threats to the country.

The sinking of Cuba: ‘We are a sacrificial altar’
PoliticsEL PAISThe Week1mo ago2 sources

The sinking of Cuba: ‘We are a sacrificial altar’

The pillars of Castroism, such as healthcare, education, the fight against poverty, and even security, are crumbling in the face of Trump’s latest blows in a society that has lost hope. Only the repressive apparatus seems to remain intact

The shutdown of USAID and the deeper crisis behind it
PoliticsDawn1mo ago

The shutdown of USAID and the deeper crisis behind it

“Why did you start driving inDrive?” It’s my go-to icebreaker with drivers in Pakistan. Lately, the answers have been unsettlingly similar. “I used to work in the development sector,” one man told me. “Then I lost my job.” I’ve heard that line — or a version of it — too many times to dismiss as coincidence. Since the United States pulled the plug on its aid apparatus, the fallout has been immediate. On the surface, the shutdown of USAID is being framed as just another abrupt policy reversal — a bureaucratic casualty in an era of disruption. But look closer, and it reveals something far more profound: the cumulative weight of domestic and international tensions that have been simmering, both within and beyond the US for decades. Cycles of aid, cycles of distrust The first source of strain lies beyond US borders. From its inception as a Cold War instrument, American foreign aid has been shaped by an enduring tension between its declared objectives of development and altruism and its underlying strategic and political calculations. This duality has long been apparent to the recipient elites and the broader public alike. During the Cold War, many governments acquiesced, in part because Western donors faced little competition and alternative sources of assistance were scarce. That landscape has since changed. As non-traditional donors, most notably China and the Gulf states, have expanded their presence, and as domestic political incentives within recipient countries have shifted, scepticism toward USAID has become more explicit and politically salient. In countries such as Pakistan, where mistrust of American intentions runs deep, US assistance is often perceived less as generosity than as intrusion. What is now framed as a backlash against American aid is better understood as the culmination of a long-simmering tension and a legacy of mutual misperceptions between donor and recipient. Pakistan’s experience with US foreign aid agency illustrates this dynamic with particular clarity. American assistance to Pakistan has never been linear or predictable; instead, it has unfolded in cycles closely attuned to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities. During the Cold War, aid was channelled primarily through a security-alliance framework aimed at containing the Soviet bloc, with economic assistance tightly coupled to military cooperation. These flows declined sharply after the 1965 war, reinforcing perceptions of US aid as conditional, transactional, and reversible. Another peak in this equation followed in the 1980s, when General Ziaul Haq aligned Pakistan with the US in opposing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear programme under the Pressler Amendment, assistance once again contracted. It was only after 9/11 that the aid surged anew, this time framed around counterterrorism and stabilisation. Even at its height, however, much of this assistance remained shaped by security imperatives, short funding horizons, and heavy reliance on contractors, rather than long-term institution-building. For many Pakistanis, therefore, the shutdown of USAID feels less like an abrupt rupture than the latest turn in a familiar cycle of engagement and disengagement. The second factor is bureaucratic pathologisation. Like many large organisations, aid agencies are susceptible to institutional dysfunction, and USAID has been no exception. In practice, particularly in contexts such as Pakistan, as commissioner on the Afghanistan War Commission Andrew Wilder has noted, its programmes increasingly came to be structured through a security lens rather than a development one. Key decisions were made in Washington, filtered through multiple layers of contractors, and ultimately deployed on the ground with limited scope for local input. At the same time, bureaucratic incentives privileged projects with easily quantifiable indicators, favouring what could be measured over what was substantively effective. These patterns were neither accidental nor new, nor are they unique to the US. Over time, however, they eroded both the legitimacy and the perceived effectiveness of USAID, among recipients abroad and critics at home. These institutional dynamics had tangible consequences on the ground. In Pakistan, USAID funding became heavily concentrated in sectors aligned with stabilisation and security objectives — such as service delivery in so-called “fragile” districts or rapid-impact infrastructure — often at the expense of slower, politically unglamorous investments in local institutional capacity. NGOs and development professionals structured entire career paths around USAID project cycles, only to see those opportunities vanish when priorities shifted or funding was abruptly frozen. The result was a hollowing out of local expertise and institutional memory. When aid was withdrawn, it left behind far fewer durable institutions than its scale and visibility might have led one to expect. The mismatch between stated development objectives and the underlying security logic was further compounded by an overreliance on quantifiable metrics to demonstrate impact. This tendency was reinforced by a development ecosystem shaped by the overproduction of economists and political scientists trained as methodological specialists rather than regional experts. Programmes designed in Washington often prioritised what could be easily counted — number of schools built, clinics refurbished, trainings delivered, or kilometres of roads completed — over whether such interventions meaningfully strengthened local institutions. In Pakistan, this logic was especially evident in sectors such as education, health, and local governance, where projects were assessed primarily through output indicators rather than sustainability or local ownership. Multiple layers of contractors further diluted accountability and blurred responsibility once funding cycles ended. Over time, this produced a paradox: USAID became both omnipresent and poorly understood — associated with large budgets and extensive reporting, but yielding limited and uneven institutional impact. That credibility gap left the agency especially exposed when domestic political support in the US began to erode. The third major factor behind the dismantling of the aid lies in the domestic backlash within the US against international cooperation. Opposition to foreign aid, multilateralism, and international institutions long predates Donald Trump, reflecting decades of polarisation over globalisation and America’s role in the world. By the time Trump entered office, hostility toward international engagement was already deeply embedded in US politics. In this context, shuttering a highly visible aid agency became a potent domestic signal; it becomes a way to demonstrate responsiveness to voters who view global commitments as costly, wasteful, or illegitimate. Dismantling USAID was therefore less a recalibration of foreign policy than an act of domestic political theatre. The US government’s official justification for shutting down USAID frames the move as a response to “China’s exploitative aid model” and a means of advancing American “strategic interests in key regions around the world”. It is true that China has dramatically expanded its development footprint and largely operates outside the traditional Western aid framework. But that explanation doesn’t hold up to deeper scrutiny. If Washington were genuinely seeking to compete with Beijing in the development arena, the more coherent response would have been reform and reinvestment, not withdrawal. Moreover, Chinese and US aid are not direct substitutes. They target different sectors, rely on distinct instruments, and frequently operate alongside one another in the same countries — Pakistan among them — without displacing each other. In Pakistan, Chinese assistance has concentrated on large-scale infrastructure and energy projects, while USAID has focused primarily on education and health. Chinese aid typically flows through bilateral, government-to-government channels, whereas US assistance has often bypassed the Pakistani state, working instead through NGOs and contractors. China’s rise may well be sharpening anxieties in Washington, but it does not, on its own, explain why the US would choose to erode its own institutional capacity in response. A looming domino effect The shutdown of USAID, then, should not be understood as a one-off policy blunder or an idiosyncratic choice tied to a single administration. Rather, it reflects the convergence of long-accumulating tensions: between the professed ideals and strategic deployment of aid abroad; between development objectives and bureaucratic practices within aid agencies; between international commitments and domestic political incentives at home. USAID’s collapse is best understood not as the cause of these pressures, but as their most visible manifestation. The consequences of this decision extend well beyond the fate of a single agency. They reveal the fragility of the broader international aid regime, which ultimately depends on the willingness of a small number of leading powers to absorb the political and financial costs of institutionalised cooperation. When that willingness erodes, institutions lose both credibility and purpose and eventually collapse. Signs of this erosion are already evident, as other major donors, including the United Kingdom and Germany, begin to scale back their own aid commitments. What is at stake, then, is not merely the dismantling of USAID, but the gradual unravelling of an international aid regime built on mutual trust and a sustained commitment to lifting the world’s poorest out of poverty.

Maduro’s gone — But is Venezuela witnessing a new 'Don'?
PoliticsBBCTimes of India1mo ago2 sources

Maduro’s gone — But is Venezuela witnessing a new 'Don'?

Venezuela is in a new political phase after President Nicolas Maduro's removal. Delcy Rodriguez now leads an interim administration. Diplomatic ties with Washington are restoring. The oil sector is opening to private operators. Hundreds of detainees have been released. However, the security apparatus remains. Elections are not yet announced. Key figures of the old establishment continue in power.