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Ramazan moon sighted in Saudi Arabia, UAE
CultureAl JazeeraTimes of IndiaDawn+1Premium Times6d ago4 sources

Ramazan moon sighted in Saudi Arabia, UAE

The Ramazan moon was sighted in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on Tuesday night, according to Gulf News. In separate reports, the publication said that Wednesday (Feb 18) would be the first day of the holy month in both countries. Meanwhile, the official Saudi Press Agency also said on X that Wednesday would be the first day of the holy month. More to follow

Armenia Opens Visa-Free Travel for Indian Expats
WorldTimes of India6d ago

Armenia Opens Visa-Free Travel for Indian Expats

Armenia has introduced a temporary visa-free regime for Indian passport holders with specific residence permits from Gulf, US, and European countries, allowing stays of up to 180 days annually.

ICC Confirmation of Charges Hearing for Former President Duterte Begins
PoliticsAPBBCAl Jazeera+14nzzyle-uutisetnosfazSCMPder-standarddie-pressedelfi-ltnikkei-asiaRapplergulf-newsinquirerchina-dailyphilstar5h ago17 sources

ICC Confirmation of Charges Hearing for Former President Duterte Begins

The International Criminal Court has commenced the confirmation of charges hearing for former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, scheduled to run for four days from February 23 to 27, 2026.

Japan's $36 Billion Bet On US Energy Dominance
Businesszerohedge1d ago

Japan's $36 Billion Bet On US Energy Dominance

Japan's $36 Billion Bet On US Energy Dominance Authored by Irina Slav via OilPrice.com, Japan has committed $36 billion as the first tranche of its $550-billion U.S. investment pledge under last year’s trade deal, including plans to build a 9.2 GW natural gas power plant in Ohio. The remaining funds will support a synthetic diamond factory and the Texas GulfLink deepwater oil export terminal. The massive gas plant reflects surging U.S. electricity demand — particularly from A...

Concerns Over Gulf Tensions
WorldFT3d ago

Concerns Over Gulf Tensions

An article discusses the potential for a dangerous showdown between the two wealthiest countries in the Middle East, emphasizing the need for de-escalation.

Sannazaro theatre fire initial estimate of damages 60-70 million euros
CultureANSA6d ago

Sannazaro theatre fire initial estimate of damages 60-70 million euros

(ANSA) - ROME, FEB 17 - Some 60-70 million euros is the initial estimate for the amount of damage sustained by the Sannazaro Theater in Naples, the temple of Neapolitan comedy, engulfed in flames on Tuesday, experts said. The figure is circulating among experts in light of the initial technical surveys carried out at the site of the fire. (ANSA). Read article...

Huge fire engulfs Naples Sannazaro theatre
CultureANSA6d ago

Huge fire engulfs Naples Sannazaro theatre

(ANSA) - ROME, FEB 17 - A huge fire broke out at the Sannazaro theatre in the centre of Naples on Tuesday. The theatre's dome was in flames, several people suffered smoke inhalation and the surrounding buildings were damaged too. Firefighters were on the scene. (ANSA). Read article...

A Venezuelan-Like Oil Blockade Against Iran Could Enable The US To Divide-And-Rule RIC
Politicszerohedge6d ago

A Venezuelan-Like Oil Blockade Against Iran Could Enable The US To Divide-And-Rule RIC

A Venezuelan-Like Oil Blockade Against Iran Could Enable The US To Divide-And-Rule RIC Authored by Andrew Korybko, The cascading consequences of such a blockade, which might not ultimately be imposed due it entailing a high risk of war with Iran, could simultaneously weaken Russia, India, and China. The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump 2.0 is considering imposing a Venezuelan-like oil blockade against Iran. It hasn’t yet done so due to concerns that Iran might attack the US’ regional military assets and/or seize its Gulf allies’ oil tankers, with either scenario destabilizing the global oil market and spiking the risk of war, so it might never ultimately happen. If the US were to successfully impose such a blockade, however, then it might be able to adroitly divide-and-rule Russia, India, and China (RIC). “The US Wants To Replicate The Venezuelan Model In Iran” by coercing Iran into subordinating itself and its energy industry to the US. The “Trump Doctrine”, which is shaped by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby’s “Strategy of Denial”, seeks to deny strategic resources to the US’ rivals. Accordingly, it has an interest in cutting off China’s average import of 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil per day last year, which could hit its economy hard if they’re not replaced (and that might be difficult). These exports could then be redirected to India, thus enabling India to more than replace its average import of 1 million barrels per day of Russian oil last month, with the revenue placed in an escrow account per the Venezuelan precedent for release to Iran if it cuts a nuclear and missile deal with the US. Through these means, India could zero out its import of Russian oil while raising the US’ role over its energy security exactly as Trump 2.0 wants, with the end result dealing incredible harm to RIC. Russia’s budgetary revenue from such sales would be reduced and could only realistically be replaced in part through more sales to China, though that might not be as easy as it sounds. The UK is preparing a campaign to seize Russia’s “shadow fleet” in the English Channel after being emboldened by the US’ seizure of a Russian-flagged oil tanker near its coast. If Russia doesn’t impose unacceptable costs on the UK, and it didn’t impose any on the US for doing this, then its Baltic Sea tankers might never reach China. Those from the Black Sea might not reach it either if the UK allies with Greece and Cyprus to cut off Russia’s “shadow fleet” from that vector too. Pipeline exports, which have limits to how much they can be scaled, would then be the only means for replacing part of Russia’s lost oil exports to India with China apart from relatively minimal tanker exports from the Far East. The resultant economic pressure on Russia and China might make them susceptible to lopsided deals with the US on Ukraine and trade. As for India, it already entered into a partially lopsided deal with the US as regards the informal quid pro quo of it agreeing to zero out its import of Russian oil in exchange for their trade deal, and the US’ growing influence over India’s energy security could curtail its hard-earned strategic autonomy. This might then be leveraged for coercing a reduction in India’s purchase of Chinese goods and services so as to place more pressure on the People’s Republic to agree to its own lopsided trade deal with the US. This worst-case scenario of the US’ dividing-and-ruling RIC can be averted by Iran deterring or breaking a US blockade on its oil in parallel with Russia doing the same with respect to any British one against its “shadow fleet”. These options require immense political will since they entail the potential cost of a hot war breaking out between Great Powers so it’s unclear whether they’ll be implemented, but likewise, so too might the US and UK ultimately back off from their possible blockades for the same reason. Tyler Durden Mon, 02/16/2026 - 20:05

Iran Conducts Naval Drills Ahead of US Nuclear Talks
PoliticsAl JazeeraFrance 247d ago2 sources

Iran Conducts Naval Drills Ahead of US Nuclear Talks

Iran has launched naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf, and Oman Sea, coinciding with its statement that the US position on its nuclear program has become 'more realistic' ahead of upcoming nuclear discussions.

Lindsey Vonn competed for 13 seconds. She still owned the Winter Olympics
SportYahoo1d ago

Lindsey Vonn competed for 13 seconds. She still owned the Winter Olympics

DOBBIACO, Italy — Go back. Find the video of that 13-second journey that Lindsey Vonn took from the starting hut to the fourth gate. The American Alpine skiing star blasts out hot, going after the Olympic women’s downhill the only way she knows how — gold or bust. And then it all happens. The slightly off-track turn. The rise off the lip of the jump. The arm hooking the red gate. The brutal tumble down the ice, those skis with knife-sharp edges twirling as the snow cloud engulfs her. Then the sl

March to war?
Politicstimes-ukDawn1d ago2 sources

March to war?

THE atmosphere in the Gulf is truly combustible, with a massive American military build-up around Iran signalling trouble ahead, unless there is a diplomatic breakthrough in the ongoing nuclear negoti

"Hubris Generally Precedes Clusterf**k": Does It Smell Like Victory?
Politicszerohedge3d ago

"Hubris Generally Precedes Clusterf**k": Does It Smell Like Victory?

"Hubris Generally Precedes Clusterf**k": Does It Smell Like Victory? Authored by James Howard Kunstler, The message seems to be something like the USA isn’t messing around with all those strike forces in the waters around Iran. The Islamic Republic suddenly looks like Rock-and-Hard-Place-Land. Everybody and his uncle are trying to figure out the calculus in play, World War Three or a happy ending? You’re seeing the most significant US military build-up over there in memory. Smells a little bit like first Gulf War, 1991 — minus all those allies we roped in then. Mr. Trump (via Marco Rubio) has read Euroland out on this one. We are in a cold war with those birds, in case you haven’t noticed. The UK, France, Germany & Co.? They are as crazy as the ladies of The View and their millions of Cluster-B followers. Euroland is yet in thrall to the climate nutters, the farm-and-industry-destroyers, the one-worlders, the Jihad-migrationists, the floundering banksters, and the Klaus Schwab wannabes. Euroland seeks to throttle free speech throughout Western Civ and meddle in everyone’s elections. Euroland keeps mouthing off about a war with Russia despite having no military mojo and going broke-ass broke faster than you can say Götterdämmerung. Bottom line: the US is going solo on this one. What is the objective? Ostensibly “a deal” over Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Like, just cut it out, will you, please? By the way, did you know that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2005 saying production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons was forbidden under Islam. But then deception is allowed in Islam under the doctrine of taqiyya, against the threat of attack from hostile forces, I’m sure you remember Operation Midnight Hammer in June last year when we attacked and supposedly “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear research and development bunkers at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan? They got pretty banged-up, you may be sure, and nobody in Iran denied there was something nukey going on in those installations. Is there a will there to rebuild the whole darn infrastructure of uranium enrichment and so forth? The mullahs are not saying, which means: of course, they intend to continue developing nuclear weapons — and even if that’s a stupid and futile gambit, given recent history, they still have factories churning out plain old long-range ballistic missiles and new drones by the thousands. Let’s face it: the mullahs are hardcore for Jihad and martyrdom. Since being elevated to Supreme Leader in 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei has sought relentlessly to transform the traditional Islamic concept of Jihad and establish it as the central pillar of the regime’s ideology. Are we doing Israel’s bidding there? (Cue: roar of affirmation.) But then, Israel has a point. Iran has been cuckoo for going on forty years. If Israel wasn’t a target of the mullahs’ eternal Shia wrath, there are their other enemies, the Sunni, on the west side of the Persian Gulf (and next door in Iraq). And consider, too, Iran’s obdurate sponsorship of Jihad, wherever possible, both within and outside the Ummah — including especially Western Civ, where low-grade Jihad has been going on for over a decade. . . mass murders, rape gangs, beheadings, trucks through the Christmas markets. . . . Okay, if Euroland is out, what about the other big dogs, Russia and China. Will they just stand by and let the US have its wicked way with Iran? Russia sent a corvette-class naval vessel down to the Straits of Hormuz for a joint operation with Iran’s navy, but what does that mean? Probably not much more than occupational therapy. Besides, Mr. Trump is just now promising to bring Russia “out from the cold” of all those onerous economic sanctions. . . to begin the process of normalizing relations. You might doubt that Russia wants to blow that for Iran’s sake. And, while it is somewhat out of the news due to the Epstein stink-bomb, and the deepness of mid-winter, there is still a war going on over in Ukraine. Which is to say, the Russians have their hands full in their own back-yard and might, perhaps, be hesitant about piling-on in Iran. And, let’s just suppose that the US objective is actually regime change in Iran. Would Russia be indisposed if the mullahs got kicked out of power? I doubt it. Russia has longstanding annoying issues with Islamic factions distributed throughout their adjoining former Soviet republics. Russia does not need Jihad. Russia might actually live more comfortably with Iran under a secular government, tilting a bit more western in temperament. Just sayin’. . . . China has more urgent concerns with Iran. China gets around 13-percent of its oil imports from Iran, and it enjoys a three to four percent discount on it. Regime change or war that could damage Iran’s oil terminals would be bad news for China. But then, China is at a long geographic remove from Iran, and China is not used to conducting military adventures so far from home, so don’t expect much assistance there. China’s other option would be to start a kerfuffle over Taiwan to distract and divert the US. We’ll just have to see about that. Uncle Xi Jinping has been busy lately sacking the upper echelons of his own military leadership. Are they even ready for action? Plus, China’s economy is wobbly. Consider also: has the US given China assurances of continued oil imports from Iran if it steers clear of the situation there? What are we operationally capable of over in Iran with all our warships, fighter jets, and other stuff? I don’t know. . . and neither do you. Looks impressive, but a couple of Sunburn-type missiles landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln could produce a profound instant attitude adjustment. Perhaps President Trump, WarSec Hegseth, and StateSec Rubio have more refined plans for disarming Iran and surgically removing the cuckoo-birds in charge. Our guys are certainly acting confident. But then in geopolitics confidence is best friends with hubris. And hubris generally precedes clusterfuck. The art of the deal is not for sissies. Tyler Durden Fri, 02/20/2026 - 16:20

Which Ramadan greeting is correct? Understanding meaning of ‘Ramadan Mubarak’ and ‘Ramadan Kareem’
CultureThe GuardianTimes of IndiaDaily Sabah4d ago3 sources

Which Ramadan greeting is correct? Understanding meaning of ‘Ramadan Mubarak’ and ‘Ramadan Kareem’

As Ramadan 2026 approaches, understanding greetings like 'Ramadan Mubarak' (Blessed Ramadan) and 'Ramadan Kareem' (Generous Ramadan) enhances cultural appreciation. While both are widely accepted globally, 'Kareem' resonates particularly in the Gulf's hospitable culture. Respectful wishes, regardless of the phrase, foster connection during this spiritual month.

Why has Qatar dedicated 2026 to celebrating Mexico?
CultureMexico News6d ago

Why has Qatar dedicated 2026 to celebrating Mexico?

Qatar is set to celebrate the best of Mexican food and culture this year, but why is the Gulf state so interested in a country on the other side of the world? The post Why has Qatar dedicated 2026 to celebrating Mexico? appeared first on Mexico News Daily

The shutdown of USAID and the deeper crisis behind it
PoliticsDawn6d ago

The shutdown of USAID and the deeper crisis behind it

“Why did you start driving inDrive?” It’s my go-to icebreaker with drivers in Pakistan. Lately, the answers have been unsettlingly similar. “I used to work in the development sector,” one man told me. “Then I lost my job.” I’ve heard that line — or a version of it — too many times to dismiss as coincidence. Since the United States pulled the plug on its aid apparatus, the fallout has been immediate. On the surface, the shutdown of USAID is being framed as just another abrupt policy reversal — a bureaucratic casualty in an era of disruption. But look closer, and it reveals something far more profound: the cumulative weight of domestic and international tensions that have been simmering, both within and beyond the US for decades. Cycles of aid, cycles of distrust The first source of strain lies beyond US borders. From its inception as a Cold War instrument, American foreign aid has been shaped by an enduring tension between its declared objectives of development and altruism and its underlying strategic and political calculations. This duality has long been apparent to the recipient elites and the broader public alike. During the Cold War, many governments acquiesced, in part because Western donors faced little competition and alternative sources of assistance were scarce. That landscape has since changed. As non-traditional donors, most notably China and the Gulf states, have expanded their presence, and as domestic political incentives within recipient countries have shifted, scepticism toward USAID has become more explicit and politically salient. In countries such as Pakistan, where mistrust of American intentions runs deep, US assistance is often perceived less as generosity than as intrusion. What is now framed as a backlash against American aid is better understood as the culmination of a long-simmering tension and a legacy of mutual misperceptions between donor and recipient. Pakistan’s experience with US foreign aid agency illustrates this dynamic with particular clarity. American assistance to Pakistan has never been linear or predictable; instead, it has unfolded in cycles closely attuned to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities. During the Cold War, aid was channelled primarily through a security-alliance framework aimed at containing the Soviet bloc, with economic assistance tightly coupled to military cooperation. These flows declined sharply after the 1965 war, reinforcing perceptions of US aid as conditional, transactional, and reversible. Another peak in this equation followed in the 1980s, when General Ziaul Haq aligned Pakistan with the US in opposing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear programme under the Pressler Amendment, assistance once again contracted. It was only after 9/11 that the aid surged anew, this time framed around counterterrorism and stabilisation. Even at its height, however, much of this assistance remained shaped by security imperatives, short funding horizons, and heavy reliance on contractors, rather than long-term institution-building. For many Pakistanis, therefore, the shutdown of USAID feels less like an abrupt rupture than the latest turn in a familiar cycle of engagement and disengagement. The second factor is bureaucratic pathologisation. Like many large organisations, aid agencies are susceptible to institutional dysfunction, and USAID has been no exception. In practice, particularly in contexts such as Pakistan, as commissioner on the Afghanistan War Commission Andrew Wilder has noted, its programmes increasingly came to be structured through a security lens rather than a development one. Key decisions were made in Washington, filtered through multiple layers of contractors, and ultimately deployed on the ground with limited scope for local input. At the same time, bureaucratic incentives privileged projects with easily quantifiable indicators, favouring what could be measured over what was substantively effective. These patterns were neither accidental nor new, nor are they unique to the US. Over time, however, they eroded both the legitimacy and the perceived effectiveness of USAID, among recipients abroad and critics at home. These institutional dynamics had tangible consequences on the ground. In Pakistan, USAID funding became heavily concentrated in sectors aligned with stabilisation and security objectives — such as service delivery in so-called “fragile” districts or rapid-impact infrastructure — often at the expense of slower, politically unglamorous investments in local institutional capacity. NGOs and development professionals structured entire career paths around USAID project cycles, only to see those opportunities vanish when priorities shifted or funding was abruptly frozen. The result was a hollowing out of local expertise and institutional memory. When aid was withdrawn, it left behind far fewer durable institutions than its scale and visibility might have led one to expect. The mismatch between stated development objectives and the underlying security logic was further compounded by an overreliance on quantifiable metrics to demonstrate impact. This tendency was reinforced by a development ecosystem shaped by the overproduction of economists and political scientists trained as methodological specialists rather than regional experts. Programmes designed in Washington often prioritised what could be easily counted — number of schools built, clinics refurbished, trainings delivered, or kilometres of roads completed — over whether such interventions meaningfully strengthened local institutions. In Pakistan, this logic was especially evident in sectors such as education, health, and local governance, where projects were assessed primarily through output indicators rather than sustainability or local ownership. Multiple layers of contractors further diluted accountability and blurred responsibility once funding cycles ended. Over time, this produced a paradox: USAID became both omnipresent and poorly understood — associated with large budgets and extensive reporting, but yielding limited and uneven institutional impact. That credibility gap left the agency especially exposed when domestic political support in the US began to erode. The third major factor behind the dismantling of the aid lies in the domestic backlash within the US against international cooperation. Opposition to foreign aid, multilateralism, and international institutions long predates Donald Trump, reflecting decades of polarisation over globalisation and America’s role in the world. By the time Trump entered office, hostility toward international engagement was already deeply embedded in US politics. In this context, shuttering a highly visible aid agency became a potent domestic signal; it becomes a way to demonstrate responsiveness to voters who view global commitments as costly, wasteful, or illegitimate. Dismantling USAID was therefore less a recalibration of foreign policy than an act of domestic political theatre. The US government’s official justification for shutting down USAID frames the move as a response to “China’s exploitative aid model” and a means of advancing American “strategic interests in key regions around the world”. It is true that China has dramatically expanded its development footprint and largely operates outside the traditional Western aid framework. But that explanation doesn’t hold up to deeper scrutiny. If Washington were genuinely seeking to compete with Beijing in the development arena, the more coherent response would have been reform and reinvestment, not withdrawal. Moreover, Chinese and US aid are not direct substitutes. They target different sectors, rely on distinct instruments, and frequently operate alongside one another in the same countries — Pakistan among them — without displacing each other. In Pakistan, Chinese assistance has concentrated on large-scale infrastructure and energy projects, while USAID has focused primarily on education and health. Chinese aid typically flows through bilateral, government-to-government channels, whereas US assistance has often bypassed the Pakistani state, working instead through NGOs and contractors. China’s rise may well be sharpening anxieties in Washington, but it does not, on its own, explain why the US would choose to erode its own institutional capacity in response. A looming domino effect The shutdown of USAID, then, should not be understood as a one-off policy blunder or an idiosyncratic choice tied to a single administration. Rather, it reflects the convergence of long-accumulating tensions: between the professed ideals and strategic deployment of aid abroad; between development objectives and bureaucratic practices within aid agencies; between international commitments and domestic political incentives at home. USAID’s collapse is best understood not as the cause of these pressures, but as their most visible manifestation. The consequences of this decision extend well beyond the fate of a single agency. They reveal the fragility of the broader international aid regime, which ultimately depends on the willingness of a small number of leading powers to absorb the political and financial costs of institutionalised cooperation. When that willingness erodes, institutions lose both credibility and purpose and eventually collapse. Signs of this erosion are already evident, as other major donors, including the United Kingdom and Germany, begin to scale back their own aid commitments. What is at stake, then, is not merely the dismantling of USAID, but the gradual unravelling of an international aid regime built on mutual trust and a sustained commitment to lifting the world’s poorest out of poverty.