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How Many Times Does This Have To Happen?
Politicszerohedge22d ago

How Many Times Does This Have To Happen?

How Many Times Does This Have To Happen? Authored by Steve Watson via Modernity.news, Yet another American life has been shattered by Democrat soft-on-crime policies that keep dangerous repeat offenders on the streets, this time in Virginia where an illegal immigrant with a staggering 30 prior arrests allegedly murdered a 41-year-old mother waiting at a bus stop. Stephanie Minter’s brutal stabbing death exposes the deadly consequences of leftist prosecutors who prioritize len...

China boy skips rope as many times as he receives likes to lose weight gets 1.8 million thumbs up
CultureSCMP1mo ago

China boy skips rope as many times as he receives likes to lose weight gets 1.8 million thumbs up

A chubby seven-year-old boy in China who agreed to skip rope exactly in line with the number of thumbs-up a video of him doing so got has seen his video clip liked by more than 1.8 million internet users. The clip released by the father, surnamed He, on February 9 was flooded with likes, amused that the boy agreed to his father’s novel weight-loss idea, the Qilu Evening News reported. The boy, nicknamed Tangdou, which means sugar bean, is being raised by his grandparents in his hometown in...

How polling about insects can help us understand the US midterms
PoliticswapoThe Guardian1mo ago2 sources

How polling about insects can help us understand the US midterms

Trump’s disapproval rating indicates he’s less popular with Americans than some insects like ants. Will it mean anything in November? This was originally published in This Week in Trumpland; sign up to receive it in your inbox every Wednesday A couple of years ago, the polling company YouGov asked people about insects. The resulting survey found that butterflies are America’s favorite insect, with eight in 10 people having a “very or somewhat positive” reaction to them. Many journalists will tell you to never trust the polling, and they’ve been proven right many times over. Still, aren’t you curious how a random group of 1,148 adults feels about bugs? Continue reading...

Mossad's Failed Iran Regime Change Plan Deemed 'Biggest Mistake' by Israel and Trump
Politicsdennik-ndigi24naftemporiki+2zerohedgepress-tv11d ago5 sources

Mossad's Failed Iran Regime Change Plan Deemed 'Biggest Mistake' by Israel and Trump

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly disappointed with Mossad for its failure to provoke a popular uprising against the Iranian regime, following reports that the intelligence agency had a plan to ignite public protests leading to the collapse of Iran's government, a strategy now critically assessed as a major error by Israel and Trump.

Fire breaks out at Serbia Pavilion at Venice Biennale
Culturen1-serbiaKorea HeraldANSA16d ago3 sources

Fire breaks out at Serbia Pavilion at Venice Biennale

(ANSA) - ROME, MAR 18 - A fire broke out on the roof of the Serbia Pavilion at the Venice Biennale on Wednesday, producing a large column of dark smoke that could be seen above the lagoon city. The fire brigade responded quickly after the alarm was sounded shortly before 10 am, but strong winds complicated the effort to put out the blaze, reigniting materials that had been extinguished and forcing the department to intervene many times. According to initial reports, the damage did not spread ...

Sarah Michelle Gellar Reveals She Declined Chloé Zhao’s ‘Buffy’ Reboot “Many Times” & Why She Learned To “Never Say Never”
Culturevarietyhollywood-reporterdeadline+2rolling-stoneenews21d ago5 sources

Sarah Michelle Gellar Reveals She Declined Chloé Zhao’s ‘Buffy’ Reboot “Many Times” & Why She Learned To “Never Say Never”

Sarah Michelle Gellar was not always keen on reprising her role as Buffy the Vampire Slayer after the series ended in 2003, following seven seasons. However, as Gellar has signed up to return to the Buffy-verse in Buffy the Vampire Slayer: New Sunnydale, she has reflected on never closing the door on the possibilities that may […]

Stranger Things puts Háafoss on the map
Cultureruv1mo ago

Stranger Things puts Háafoss on the map

It is considered likely that tourists visiting Háafoss in Þjórsárdalur will be many times more numerous this year than last year, after the waterfall appeared in the final episode of the Stranger Things series.

Washington and Cuba and the Evidence of Real Change
Politicshavana-times1mo ago

Washington and Cuba and the Evidence of Real Change

Too many times, a new process of transformation has been announced that ends up being merely a change of tone, a reversible concession... The post Washington and Cuba and the Evidence of Real Change appeared first on Havana Times.

20-Year Study Reveals Limits to Cloning Clones in Mice
ScienceThe Independenthotnews11d ago2 sources

20-Year Study Reveals Limits to Cloning Clones in Mice

A landmark 20-year study involving 1,206 cloned mice has revealed an unexpected limit to how many times a clone can be cloned, addressing long-standing speculation about the potential degrading effect of successive cloning.

Man Accused of Ilaria Sula's Murder Testifies in Court
Worldbalkan-web18d ago

Man Accused of Ilaria Sula's Murder Testifies in Court

Mark Antony Samson, accused of murdering 22-year-old Albanian Ilaria Sula, testified before the Rome Court of Serious Crimes, stating that 'a curtain blocked his eyes' and he doesn't remember how many times he struck her.

Wet hair causes colds: myth or reality?
Healthobservador23d ago

Wet hair causes colds: myth or reality?

How many times have you heard: 'Don't go out with wet hair or you'll catch a cold'? The phrase spans generations — but is it true? We explain what really causes colds and why the myth persists.

Jewelry from Unverified Sources May Cause Cancer
Worldhvg1mo ago

Jewelry from Unverified Sources May Cause Cancer

The National Public Health and Pharmacy Center warns that jewelry ordered from East Asian online marketplaces may contain cadmium levels many times higher than the prescribed limit, potentially causing cancerous diseases.

The shutdown of USAID and the deeper crisis behind it
PoliticsDawn1mo ago

The shutdown of USAID and the deeper crisis behind it

“Why did you start driving inDrive?” It’s my go-to icebreaker with drivers in Pakistan. Lately, the answers have been unsettlingly similar. “I used to work in the development sector,” one man told me. “Then I lost my job.” I’ve heard that line — or a version of it — too many times to dismiss as coincidence. Since the United States pulled the plug on its aid apparatus, the fallout has been immediate. On the surface, the shutdown of USAID is being framed as just another abrupt policy reversal — a bureaucratic casualty in an era of disruption. But look closer, and it reveals something far more profound: the cumulative weight of domestic and international tensions that have been simmering, both within and beyond the US for decades. Cycles of aid, cycles of distrust The first source of strain lies beyond US borders. From its inception as a Cold War instrument, American foreign aid has been shaped by an enduring tension between its declared objectives of development and altruism and its underlying strategic and political calculations. This duality has long been apparent to the recipient elites and the broader public alike. During the Cold War, many governments acquiesced, in part because Western donors faced little competition and alternative sources of assistance were scarce. That landscape has since changed. As non-traditional donors, most notably China and the Gulf states, have expanded their presence, and as domestic political incentives within recipient countries have shifted, scepticism toward USAID has become more explicit and politically salient. In countries such as Pakistan, where mistrust of American intentions runs deep, US assistance is often perceived less as generosity than as intrusion. What is now framed as a backlash against American aid is better understood as the culmination of a long-simmering tension and a legacy of mutual misperceptions between donor and recipient. Pakistan’s experience with US foreign aid agency illustrates this dynamic with particular clarity. American assistance to Pakistan has never been linear or predictable; instead, it has unfolded in cycles closely attuned to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities. During the Cold War, aid was channelled primarily through a security-alliance framework aimed at containing the Soviet bloc, with economic assistance tightly coupled to military cooperation. These flows declined sharply after the 1965 war, reinforcing perceptions of US aid as conditional, transactional, and reversible. Another peak in this equation followed in the 1980s, when General Ziaul Haq aligned Pakistan with the US in opposing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear programme under the Pressler Amendment, assistance once again contracted. It was only after 9/11 that the aid surged anew, this time framed around counterterrorism and stabilisation. Even at its height, however, much of this assistance remained shaped by security imperatives, short funding horizons, and heavy reliance on contractors, rather than long-term institution-building. For many Pakistanis, therefore, the shutdown of USAID feels less like an abrupt rupture than the latest turn in a familiar cycle of engagement and disengagement. The second factor is bureaucratic pathologisation. Like many large organisations, aid agencies are susceptible to institutional dysfunction, and USAID has been no exception. In practice, particularly in contexts such as Pakistan, as commissioner on the Afghanistan War Commission Andrew Wilder has noted, its programmes increasingly came to be structured through a security lens rather than a development one. Key decisions were made in Washington, filtered through multiple layers of contractors, and ultimately deployed on the ground with limited scope for local input. At the same time, bureaucratic incentives privileged projects with easily quantifiable indicators, favouring what could be measured over what was substantively effective. These patterns were neither accidental nor new, nor are they unique to the US. Over time, however, they eroded both the legitimacy and the perceived effectiveness of USAID, among recipients abroad and critics at home. These institutional dynamics had tangible consequences on the ground. In Pakistan, USAID funding became heavily concentrated in sectors aligned with stabilisation and security objectives — such as service delivery in so-called “fragile” districts or rapid-impact infrastructure — often at the expense of slower, politically unglamorous investments in local institutional capacity. NGOs and development professionals structured entire career paths around USAID project cycles, only to see those opportunities vanish when priorities shifted or funding was abruptly frozen. The result was a hollowing out of local expertise and institutional memory. When aid was withdrawn, it left behind far fewer durable institutions than its scale and visibility might have led one to expect. The mismatch between stated development objectives and the underlying security logic was further compounded by an overreliance on quantifiable metrics to demonstrate impact. This tendency was reinforced by a development ecosystem shaped by the overproduction of economists and political scientists trained as methodological specialists rather than regional experts. Programmes designed in Washington often prioritised what could be easily counted — number of schools built, clinics refurbished, trainings delivered, or kilometres of roads completed — over whether such interventions meaningfully strengthened local institutions. In Pakistan, this logic was especially evident in sectors such as education, health, and local governance, where projects were assessed primarily through output indicators rather than sustainability or local ownership. Multiple layers of contractors further diluted accountability and blurred responsibility once funding cycles ended. Over time, this produced a paradox: USAID became both omnipresent and poorly understood — associated with large budgets and extensive reporting, but yielding limited and uneven institutional impact. That credibility gap left the agency especially exposed when domestic political support in the US began to erode. The third major factor behind the dismantling of the aid lies in the domestic backlash within the US against international cooperation. Opposition to foreign aid, multilateralism, and international institutions long predates Donald Trump, reflecting decades of polarisation over globalisation and America’s role in the world. By the time Trump entered office, hostility toward international engagement was already deeply embedded in US politics. In this context, shuttering a highly visible aid agency became a potent domestic signal; it becomes a way to demonstrate responsiveness to voters who view global commitments as costly, wasteful, or illegitimate. Dismantling USAID was therefore less a recalibration of foreign policy than an act of domestic political theatre. The US government’s official justification for shutting down USAID frames the move as a response to “China’s exploitative aid model” and a means of advancing American “strategic interests in key regions around the world”. It is true that China has dramatically expanded its development footprint and largely operates outside the traditional Western aid framework. But that explanation doesn’t hold up to deeper scrutiny. If Washington were genuinely seeking to compete with Beijing in the development arena, the more coherent response would have been reform and reinvestment, not withdrawal. Moreover, Chinese and US aid are not direct substitutes. They target different sectors, rely on distinct instruments, and frequently operate alongside one another in the same countries — Pakistan among them — without displacing each other. In Pakistan, Chinese assistance has concentrated on large-scale infrastructure and energy projects, while USAID has focused primarily on education and health. Chinese aid typically flows through bilateral, government-to-government channels, whereas US assistance has often bypassed the Pakistani state, working instead through NGOs and contractors. China’s rise may well be sharpening anxieties in Washington, but it does not, on its own, explain why the US would choose to erode its own institutional capacity in response. A looming domino effect The shutdown of USAID, then, should not be understood as a one-off policy blunder or an idiosyncratic choice tied to a single administration. Rather, it reflects the convergence of long-accumulating tensions: between the professed ideals and strategic deployment of aid abroad; between development objectives and bureaucratic practices within aid agencies; between international commitments and domestic political incentives at home. USAID’s collapse is best understood not as the cause of these pressures, but as their most visible manifestation. The consequences of this decision extend well beyond the fate of a single agency. They reveal the fragility of the broader international aid regime, which ultimately depends on the willingness of a small number of leading powers to absorb the political and financial costs of institutionalised cooperation. When that willingness erodes, institutions lose both credibility and purpose and eventually collapse. Signs of this erosion are already evident, as other major donors, including the United Kingdom and Germany, begin to scale back their own aid commitments. What is at stake, then, is not merely the dismantling of USAID, but the gradual unravelling of an international aid regime built on mutual trust and a sustained commitment to lifting the world’s poorest out of poverty.